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‘Tis an unweeded garden,
That grows to seed; things rank and gross in nature
Possess it merely.1
IN 1956, anthropologist Horace Miner published the article for whichhe is best known, Body Ritual among the Nacirema.2 This short butgroundbreaking essay described rituals practiced by a fascinating
people whom Professor Miner situated ethnographically “between the
Canadian Cree, the Yaqui and Tarahumare of Mexico, and the Carib and
Arawak of the Antilles.”3 Notwithstanding his focus on the microcosm of
individual habits and customs, Miner sought to make a larger point. He
concluded the work with a quote from the great Bronislaw Malinowski
about the value of studying lesser developed societies:
Looking from far and above, from our high places of safety in the
developed civilization, it is easy to see all the crudity and irrelevance
of magic. But without its power and guidance early man could not
have mastered his practical difficulties as he has done, nor could man
have advanced to the higher stages of civilization.4
Almost sixty years have passed since Miner’s observations from “our
high places of safety in the developed civilization.” Miner died in 1993,
after a distinguished career teaching at the University of Michigan and
researching in the field, primarily in Nigeria, Morocco, and Algeria.5
(Among his best known works was his 1953 study, The Primitive City of
Timbuctoo). But his obituary notice remarked that, with regard to his
work on the Nacirema, “Miner regularly received letters from curious
readers who wanted to know more about this fascinating and exotic
group.”6
Inspired by Miner’s work and based on close-quarters fieldwork, this
essay revisits the strange world of the Nacirema. Two of the more “legal”
features of their society are explored: (1) what might be termed the
higher-order constitutional design of their society, and (2) the mecha-
nisms of day-to-day maintenance of their social order. In conclusion, I
note a strange characteristic of the Nacirema: although they believe that
their own socio-legal order can, and should, be transplanted into liminal
societies, they resist such transfers in the other direction. Regardless of
one’s interest in the Nacirema as a people, their experiments with the
structure and order of their society are worth our attention. A system that
has worked quite well for them (at least, many of them), may not be so
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easily transplanted as some might think. Why this should be is of aca-
demic as well as practical importance and worth continuing study.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The reader is strongly encouraged to consult Miner’s still authoritative
study at 58 American Anthropologist. Miner described Nacirema culture
as “characterized by a highly developed market economy which has
evolved in a rich natural habitat.”7 Trade was first based on cash crops
increasingly reliant on labor-intensive farming methods.8 Slavery supplied
that labor.9 Although no longer practiced, its demographic effects remain
profound and still may be perceived in differentials measurable along
many socio-economic variables.10
Despite, or perhaps because of this origin, the Nacirema embrace a
founding mythology based on the importance of human freedom and
equality. The first Nacirema did not perceive the oddity so clear to us of
holding such ideals in a slave-supported economy. In fact, a great many
felt called to defend the practice, “with whatever weapons freemen can
lay their hands on, and to carry high the banners of the free, whatever
may betide.”11
In addition to slavery, social growth was also propelled by the Naci-
rema’s belief in their divine entitlement to the lands of neighboring peo-
ples.12 This view (the founding mythos of freedom and equality again
notwithstanding) justified the slaughter and subjugation of these neigh-
bors, the destruction of their cultures, and the seizure of their lands. The
Nacirema seem strangely blind to these transgressions against other peo-
ples and cultures.13
Thus, the Nacirema seem to manage an incongruous relationship be-
tween their myths and their might. Beyond these ideologies, the Naci-
rema (who possess a written language) have committed their socio-legal
organizational principles to a sacred text. Its sacred quality—although
disputed by some scholars of the Nacirema—is evidenced by both extrin-
sic and intrinsic factors that make it highly resistant to change.
The text was composed in secret by the Great Men of Nacirema prehis-
tory. These Great Men are revered in popular culture, although most Na-
cirema know little about them beyond their iconic, almost deified status
and a few tall tales that become more difficult to separate from the histor-
ical record with the passage of time. Yet an increasingly popular view
demands that the sacred text be interpreted just as it would have been
understood in the social milieu of the Great Men themselves.14 This is
despite the fact that, even in the hands of the most able Nacirema wise
men, the historical record appears to be quite ambiguous, if not
malleable.
The text itself contains no overt mention of slavery (just as it does not
mention conquest), but careful readers may discern oblique references.15
The text makes only one explicit reference to equality.16 This relatively
late addition has been the subject of intense debate and, just as often,
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limiting interpretations. For instance, it has been deemed irrelevant to
many of the forms of inequality that pervade Nacirema society. In any
event, its inclusion in the sacred text appears to have only partially and
gradually ameliorated some of the baseline inequalities in the society
traceable to past slavery, archaic gender norms, and the continuing
hyper-stratification of property regimes.
The sacred text establishes a triumvirate of rulers who govern simulta-
neously. Some, but not all, of these rulers are chosen by the people. Two
of the three ruling bodies are corporate in form, while the third is a king
figure who sits atop a pyramid of assistants of varying fealty. While this
complexity might seem unwieldy, it appears to be helped along by a belief
that the rulers and ruled all operate under divine providence. Seldom is a
ruler heard to speak who does not invoke the deity’s will and blessings for
the society. Further field research is necessary to determine how, if at all,
Nacirema oratory reflects the influence of these beliefs on action.
Each power center is allocated a large stone palace. These are heavily
guarded. Although each palace is considered a house of the people, open
to all, very few Nacirema are allowed unhindered access. There is a
strange parallel here with the work of these bodies. Their commands (and
the process by which these are generated) are deemed the treasure of all,
and all are expected to be bound by their proclamation. But few under-
stand the esoterica of what is produced in each palace, let alone how the
public spectacle of its production is influenced by what occurs behind the
palaces’ many closed doors and secret chambers.
In tribute to their status, the triumvirate and their senior-most advisors
are given many social and financial advantages unavailable to ordinary
Nacirema, some of which continue long after they depart their offices.
This may seem contrary to the mythos of equality, especially since these
leaders seem least in need of any public subsidy in comparison to the
common folk. But the Nacirema seem to tolerate it. Indeed, field research
reveals that few members of the society completely understand the differ-
ent rituals for the triumvirate’s selection nor care to participate in them
with any regularity.17
The first set of rulers mentioned in the text is a corporate collective of
elders. Their regular selection is organized around their affiliation with
one of two main social factions.  These are symbolized by different ani-
mals (neither one, oddly enough, indigenous to the region). The selection
process requires special ceremonies not mentioned in the sacred text. In-
deed, historians of the early Nacirema suggest that such factions were
discouraged by many of the Great Men, but this fact—if fact—has been
ignored.18  Wealth, personal or otherwise, is an essential prerequisite in
the selection process. Thus, most find such social position unattainable,
adding to its mystery and prestige. This extra-governmental ordering also
redirects control of much governance into the hands of each faction’s own
hierarchy of elders. Their decisions often dictate the more formalized
public rituals of norm creation with which this body is charged.
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The second ruler is a traditional king figure. (There is nothing in the
sacred text requiring a male leader, but the alternative would have been
considered outlandish by the Nacirema for most of their history, remains
insensate for many today, and has yet to occur.) The Nacirema tend to
favor for this position those trained in war; most kings were Nacirema
warriors in their youth.19 Although popularly perceived as an office of
considerable power—the Nacirema instinctively blame the king for virtu-
ally every problem that occurs during his reign—the outside observer
must be surprised by just how little the king can do on his own. However,
this fact does not seem to stop the king or the elders from frequent proc-
lamations to the contrary. This seems only to increase the general
confusion.
The king is chosen through a quadrennial selection described in the
sacred text in great detail. This process is heavily influenced by a proceed-
ing organized by the extra-textual animal factions mentioned above,
though the text makes no mention of their involvement. Both processes,
however, defy common understanding and are unlike any other proce-
dure used in other societies. It appears to grant Nacirema in relatively
sparsely populated settlements early, outsized influence over the initial
slate of competitors, while those in preferred regions have the power to
choose a king unacceptable to a simple majority.
The third body, another collective, is the true source for the rules that
govern Nacirema society. It is composed of a quasi-priestly class whose
elite are esteemed as the true interpreters of the sacred text. This gives
them extraordinary power. They are the only rulers who are not elected,
but chosen by agreement of the other two ruling bodies. The priests then
rule for life. They are the only rulers who wear a costume (long, black
gowns), carry a weapon (wooden mallets), and expect to be addressed by
an honorific rather than by reference to their position.
None of these characteristics is to be found in the sacred text (indeed,
the exclusive power to interpret the sacred text is one that the priests
bestowed on themselves), but they are nevertheless accepted by the Naci-
rema almost without question.20 The young, particularly those who train
to be scribes, champions, and lawgivers themselves, are taught to revere
the priests through a process of acculturation and training that revolves
around the study of their many sacred decrees. On occasion, the highest
order priests have even been known to decide who should be given posi-
tions in the other ruling bodies.21
Sometimes the other palaces, or the people themselves, challenge the
high priests’ rule. Angered by an interpretation of the sacred text, they
may engage in massive resistance, ignoring or circumventing priestly de-
crees that would be unquestioned in other instances.22 The most promi-
nent instances of this recalcitrant behavior are associated with priestly
decrees seeking to remedy the after-effects of slavery in Nacirema
society.
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Other times, resistance may come from officials lower in the society.
On some issues, at least, there appears to be an almost cyclical disregard
for decrees. Consider, for example, repeated decrees by the high priests
that prohibit practices tending to hurt the poor (whom wealthier Naci-
rema tend to avoid and sometimes seem even to fear) by banishing them
from public places. This disturbing feature of Nacirema social organiza-
tion is telling, for as Gandhi noted, “A nation’s greatness is measured by
how it treats its weakest members.”
Here one perceives what appears to be a certain de´ja` vu feature to the
cycle of sacred decrees: the newer decrees remind the reader of the older
ones, which were essentially the same, but seem not to possess any dis-
cernible long-term effect.23 Social fears seem simply to overwhelm ordi-
nary Nacirema respect for their priests, who then must return to the same
matters in future decrees about the same issue. Little mention of this cy-
cle is made in the decrees themselves, perhaps out of anxiety that the
whole decree-issuing edifice rests on Nacirema respect for this power of
the priesthood. Since their power is without firm foundation in the sacred
text itself, the high priests appear to be institutionally cautious not to
over-employ it.
In short, the Nacerima proudly perceive themselves to be broadly dem-
ocratic in their social organization. Their texts and myths certainly both
point in that direction. In reality, however, perhaps only a plurality un-
derstand their system of government, fewer care to participate in it, a
minority can seat the king, and the unelected high priests rule for life.
Governance is not infrequently administered by this priesthood and by
officials chosen through arcane rituals controlled by special groups. The
Nacirema, like most societies, venerate their past but with a rather shal-
low understanding of it. This combination seems to generate a certain
stability for a society that is otherwise marked by high levels of inequality
that, while decreasing along some social and economic dimensions, in-
creases along others.
II. MAINTAINING SOCIAL ORDER
The sacred text enshrines certain rituals that the Nacirema believe pro-
tect them from social harm. For example, Nacirema accused of some
transgression against the community may insist on the judgment of neu-
tral neighbors, who meet in secret to decide the fate of the accused after a
ritual of public orations by champions for each side.24 This ritual will be
discussed further below.
Another ritual found in the sacred text requires constables to obtain
the permission of lower-level priests before intruding into a Nacirema
home or private spaces.25 In addition, the high priests have added other
protections not found in the sacred text. For instance, the constable must
utter a special magic phrase before seizing and questioning a suspected
wrongdoer.26 Field research indicates that the mantra’s imposition may
only tend to kindle the imagination of constables to employ methods of
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interrogation (or sequence those methods in ways) that more advanced
societies might consider grueling or degrading. But the Nacirema believe,
or at least their priesthood have decreed, that this spell will prevent any
undeserved harm from befalling the recipient.27
Such beliefs may seem strange to us. Of course, we have the benefit of
our more scientific study of the nature of false confessions and the primi-
tive nature of such interrogations. So we must not judge the Nacirema out
of their social context. In Nacirema society, constables are entrusted with
the enforcement of voluminous codices containing thousands of trans-
gressions ranging from the great ones found in all social orders (e.g. mur-
der) to the very small and strange (such as public sleeping).28 Even a
greatly admired Nacirema champion, and later high priest, noted that
“[w]ith the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecu-
tor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of some act
on the part of almost anyone.”29 And as one field researcher observed,
the trend is toward “overlapping crimes, such that a single criminal inci-
dent typically violates a half dozen or more prohibitions. . . . [Nacirema]
legislatures regularly add to criminal codes, but rarely subtract from
them. In a world like that, lists of crimes in statute books must bear only a
slight relation to the conduct that leads to a stay in the local house of
corrections.”30
Such a large compass may seem hard to explain in a society that ex-
pects its members not only to abide by all of its rules, but to feel a sense
of shared responsibility for their promulgation. Yet the constable is
granted a special power that makes his work appear almost like a game.
He is allowed, if not encouraged, to pretend to seek to enforce some in-
significant, easily violated part of one of the many codes (every Nacirema
constable has his favorites, but especially popular is the code governing
daily migrations between home, work, and play—the Nacirema love to
move about and spend much time doing so). Having gained a toehold on
this pretext, he then searches for evidence of more serious transgressions
about which he lacks evidence enough to satisfy one of the lower priests
but that his hunches (or prejudices) assure him can be found. So long as
some minor malefaction can later be identified that warranted a stop (and
one almost always can be found), no one bothers with the constable’s
actual motive.31 The Nacirema seem to tolerate this sleight-of-hand as
long as the social order seems reasonably well-preserved by it. Perhaps
another factor is that, empirically, the burdens of this practice tend to be
imposed disproportionately on marginalized social groups.
A word now about the public trial ritual already mentioned. Many of
the ritual’s adversarial characteristics are enshrined in the sacred text.
One could be forgiven the misperception, shared by the Nacirema them-
selves, that it is based on an equality of arms between accuser and ac-
cused maintained by a neutral magistrate who referees the contest
between them. Neophyte champions, priests, even constables, are taught
this myth, and it retains its central place in Nacirema conceptions of their
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social order.32 The lay population consumes a steady diet of literature
and theater in which such institutions are seen to achieve great feats of
justice attributed to the nature of the adversarial procedures themselves.
Oddly, this tableau of justice is rarely experienced in reality. According
to one Nacirema priest, the vast majority of defendants subject them-
selves to a different system than the one described in the constitutional
text, and one not foreseen by it.33 As another Nacirema priest observed,
“A Martian anthropologist, sent to observe criminal justice . . . but lack-
ing access to our textbooks, would have relatively little to say about
trials.”34
Instead, most defendants make due with what the first priest himself
described as a “brief formal procedure” over which the priests preside
that certifies an agreement to forego the trial ritual in exchange for a
reduced punishment. The procedure that replaces the trial is intended
more to close the period of uncertainty about the defendant’s fate than to
decide legal issues or weigh conflicting evidence.35 This veneer covering
the sacred text’s prescribed process “obscures what can be an invisible,
but elaborate and lengthy process of adjudication of the defendant’s guilt.
This process is rarely governed by formal legal standards, other than the
basic definitions of offenses, and the procedures by which it operates are
not usually written down anywhere. But it is this process that our alien
anthropologist would surely identify as the actual adjudication process for
criminal cases.”36
This reality looks quite a bit different than the ideal described in the
law and imbibed by the young who study in hopes of becoming great
champions and priests themselves.37 As one priest recently argued, the
“suggestion that a plea bargain is a fair and voluntary contractual ar-
rangement between two relatively equal parties is a total myth: it is much
more like a ‘contract of adhesion’ in which one party can effectively force
its will on the other party.”38 There is here, as elsewhere in Nacirema
society, a stark disparity between the law’s effects and enforcement that
varies according to wealth (often covariant with race), despite a well-
known admonition popular in that society not to ration justice.39 The Na-
cirema believe in severe punishments, including death (quite unusual
even in less civilized societies), and these stakes serve a certain unspoken
coercive role in the actual way the system works.40 The Nacirema im-
prison more of their people than any other comparable society.41 This
may explain why they expend roughly the same amount of money for
their entire judicial branch of government as for their prisons alone.42
A word should be said about the way Nacirema view their law in
threatening times. Of course, every society faces pressure to ignore the
counsel of its better angels when danger draws near. The Nacirema are no
more immune to this human phenomenon than other societies, though
they tend to believe otherwise. It is their insistence that they are excep-
tional that draws the puzzlement of the social scientist and scholar. An
example may be found in the strangely permeable boundary that the Na-
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cirema have developed between their laws in times of peace and in times
of war. It appears to be important to Nacirema society to make a sharp
distinction between these two times, while insisting that law remains a
bulwark protecting everyone at all times.
Upon closer inspection, however, this appears to be primitive mytholo-
gizing similar to the equality myth and fair trial myth discussed above.
While important for cultural reasons, this belief does not reflect the real-
ity of Nacirema society. Not long ago, the Nacirema suffered a surprise
attack from unforeseen enemies that killed thousands and shook the so-
cial order by exposing its vulnerability. It took relatively little time before
the Nacirema appear to have engaged in torture with a frequency that
belies the absolute prohibition of the practice expressed in their laws and
those of the most advanced nations.43 Nacirema courts refuse to hear
complaints alleging torture, whether filed by enemies of the Nacirema,
neutrals, or even their own citizens.44 Strangely, the priesthood seemed to
concede the possibility that the injuries alleged may be true, while at the
same time insisting that they must not be asked to remedy them. Why
they did not exercise their special prerogative to render justice is unclear.
But special deference to Nacirema warriors may be a partial explanation,
as anxiety that the warriors will ignore the judges has been a recurring
them in their past, dating at least to the slave era.45
It is also worth noting that although the Nacirema hold their trial ritu-
als in high esteem, they have been reluctant to permit access to them in
what may be called “special” cases. Those suspected of complicity with
the enemies of the Nacirema tend to be held in special prisons controlled
by Nacirema warriors or other tribes and refused access to normal judi-
cial forums or champions to speak for them. They may be held for years
at a time, and subject to quite barbaric treatment, before being processed
through the plea-bargain system described above or convicted of offenses
quite different than those originally alleged against them.
Most Nacirema, again notwithstanding their professed high regard for
justice and the rule of law, do not seem to care much about these cases.
Astonishingly, they exhibit a rather blithe disregard even for measures to
curtail their freedom of movement (which many take for granted) with-
out any oversight even by the lowest level priests.46 Further field work is
required to determine whether this cognitive dissonance is related to the
previously noted low levels of participation in leadership selection.
Of course, one might understand a disinclination to open Nacirema
courts to enemies captured abroad. Indeed, the Nacirema appear little
different from other societies in insisting on the detention and trial of
such enemies in forums quite different than those reserved for domestic
transgressions. Oddly, however, the permeable boundary appears here,
too. Sometimes, enemies may be captured on a battlefield or kidnapped
from their enemy camps by Nacirema warriors before transport for ap-
pearances before priests in the homeland. During this time, they are sub-
jected to intensive and (some suspect, brutal) interrogation.47
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III. CONCLUSION
The thick descriptions of anthropological discourse can seem too criti-
cal at times. Students of human nature habitually compare other societies
to their own and tend to find them wanting. Indeed, one prominent Naci-
rema priest himself noted his “dismay that [critical observers of the Naci-
rema] have allowed the pursuit of perfection in criminal justice to become
the enemy of the good.”48 It is worth noting a few extraordinary qualities
of the Nacirema social order by way of conclusion.
First, compared to so many other societies, the Nacirema have few
problems with public corruption: the Nacirema tend not to bribe the con-
stable.49 Such a state of affairs is the envy of many societies but taken for
granted by most Nacirema (who seldom think about it).
Second, their society is remarkably tolerant of offensive speech: its
people jealously guard their open forums against any hint of censorship.
Perhaps these attributes arise from the Nacirema’s supreme confidence in
the strength of their society. Having reached such unassailable heights,
rebellious speech seems unthreatening to them. (This seems a plausible
explanation, since when confidence of unassailability is low, intolerance
grows.)50
Third, unlike most other societies, its internal subdivisions are not
based on religious or ethnographic differences. Indeed, its internal
boundaries are almost antiseptic in this regard, based instead on geo-
graphic features or even the straight lines of early surveyors. Doubtless
much strife has been avoided by this banality, which (again) tends to be
taken for granted by the inhabitants.
Finally and notwithstanding all of the peculiarities and shortcomings
that must strike the modern observer, the Nacirema perceive their law as
highly advanced. There can be no doubt that Nacirema leaders have
achieved a high level of devotion and loyalty from their people to the
institutional structures of their society, such that these structures are
rarely questioned. Even to the outside observer, there seems good reason
for the pride the Nacirema exhibit. The Nacirema have created a society
in which, for good reasons, many desire to live. But it is not their low
corruption/high tolerance society that they are so eager to export. The Na-
cirema take these traits for granted, as people grown use to freedom and
prosperity often do.
This, then, is the oddest feature of Nacirema legal culture: the Naci-
rema encourage adoption of their social organization, systems of law and
norm creation, and methods for their enforcement, though these may be
ill-suited to other societies. Without irony (given what is known about the
low participation of the Nacirema in these practices), the Nacirema tout
the value of their governance and their trial practices. Their sense of su-
periority leads to a certain evangelism toward other societies when the
Nacirema might, like Candide, cultivate their own gardens.51
An example of this strange tendency occurred in the years shortly
before and just after Miner’s death in 1993, thus eluding his sharp eye. As
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is well-known, the world witnessed at that time the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the revolutionary freedom of the peoples of what was once
called “the second world.” 52 The Nacirema were not of that world and
little understood it, although they failed as much as anyone in the “first”
and “third” worlds to avoid the Cold War’s proxy conflicts and ideologi-
cal struggles. Miner would have viewed the reaction of the Nacirema to
these events with keen anthropological interest. For with a missionary
zeal, the Nacirema perceived a role for their society as a guiding light to
Central and Eastern European peoples desperate to reorient themselves
toward a rule of law that had been lost to some countries for fifty years or
more, and in some realms seemed never to have been known at all.
Nacirema efforts, both public and private, delivered their accumulated
wisdom and experience to the countries emerging from the Warsaw
Pact.53 Preˆt–a`–porter drafts of statutes on a host of subjects were sent to
freshly elected legislatures. A cottage industry arose to provide training
in trial techniques, judicial ethics, and other skills and education.54
From our perspective of dispassionate remove, it remains puzzling why
the Nacirema not only expected these liminal social orders to be particu-
larly receptive to such legal transplants, but fully expected the seeds that
they planted to flourish in foreign soils. Some did in some places. Often,
however, these efforts overlooked pre-existing legal traditions, histories,
and cultures, which substantially reduced the fruit they bore. To be sure,
the best Nacirema efforts in this regard exhibited a greater self-awareness
that modulated the risks inherent in such prideful assertiveness. But the
tendency remains noteworthy.
More study is warranted of this interesting impulse of the Nacirema,
which seems driven in equal measures by idealism and self-preservation.
In an increasingly interconnected world, what role should societies like
the Nacirema play in such liminal and transitory periods of state-build-
ing? The Nacirema have grown secure in the conclusion that the design of
their society ought to serve as a model for others. There is certainly great
beauty in their garden, but weeds grow there too. We should recall the
cautionary words with which Miner himself began his classic study: “The
anthropologist has become so familiar with the diversity of ways in which
different peoples behave in similar situations that he is not apt to be sur-
prised by even the most exotic customs.”55
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